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In times of substantially reduced  spending, it is unlikely that there  will be
many farm program participants who are better off as a result of  the  1995 Farm
Bill. Even farmers and ranchers who do not participate in the farm program will
be affected bythe farm bill, as acreage reduction requirements are modified, and
reduced  benefits create  the  potential  for marginal  lands  being converted  to
grazing, entered into a reduced CRP program, or simply returned to their natural
state. The critical point is that, whereas some farmers and ranchers in the past
looked to farm bills to solve financial problems or stabilize prices, this is not a
reasonable expectation for the 1995  Farm Bill.
Reconciliation  in the past has played an  important role  in the develop-
ment  of farm  policy.  Recall  that  in  the  1990  Farm  Bill  the  flexibility/
nonpaid acreage provision was enacted as a part of  farm policy by the budget
reconciliation  process. In addition, annual adjustments have been made in
farm  programs  to  bring  expenditures  within  the  budget  reconciliation
guidelines. The 1995 Farm Bill, however, will likely expand the role of the
reconciliation process  in agricultural policy development even further.
What is new and different about the 1995 Farm Bill is that reconciliation
appears to be the  driving force of the farm bill process-at least so far as
mandatory  spending related  to the major crops  and dairy are concerned.
Moreover, ideological mandates from the majority leadership, particularly
in the House,  appear to  be driving the process,  as opposed to traditional
debate and compromise procedures. In the process, authorizing committees
appear to be more partisan, and, therefore, relatively less important in farm
policy development.
Farm organizations do not appear to have anticipated/adjusted  to these
changes  nearly as well as agribusiness organizations. In fact, agribusiness
did its homework early and appeared to be in a position to capitalize on the
realities of change itself. This certainly seemed to be true of organizations
such as the National  Grain and Feed Dealers Association  and the Interna-
tional Dairy Foods Association.
Illustrative of the relative  lack  of preparation  and homework  by farm
organizations is the overwhelming perception that agriculture is prospering
and that government  payments to large farmers are simply bankrolled  as
profits. Lobbyists,  such as  Ken Cook, may not have been as  effective  in
pursuing an expanded environmental objective.  However, Cook certainly
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productive, and purely political pork.
To  date,  in  the  1995  Farm  Bill debate,  the  objectives  of farm  policy
appear to be less clearly in focus. However,  Congress has never been very
good at defining multiple objectives  for farm policy, nor, for that matter,
policy in general. In 1995, the deficit reduction objective has overwhelmed
the farm bill development process. Policymakers and special interests alike
seem  to have lost sight of other priorities and what it takes to maintain an
effective, but economically viable, program. Arguably, the primary House
objective was to eliminate government subsidies to farmers. Even then, the
House  Agriculture  Committee  Chair  denied  that  the  Freedom-to-Farm
(FTFA) provisions were transition payments to a substantially scaled-down
role for the federal government  in traditional program  commodities.
House and Senate Farm Bill Options
Tables 1 and 2 indicate the policy proposals that were on the table at the
time of the  initial  FTFA  votes  in the  House  of Representatives  in  late
September.  They are instructive, because  they indicate the very different
views  on the appropriate  policy direction,  even as the Committees  were
scheduled to mark up and vote.
On  the  House  side,  the  leadership  choice was FTFA,  a proposal  that
completely decoupled prices from payments by basing payments on histori-
cal  levels,  and  allowing farmers  full  flexibility  to produce  any program
crops. In the process, the target price, milk price supports and federal milk
marketing orders would be eliminated.
The  proposal  was  designed  to  reach  the House  budget  reconciliation
objective  of $13.4  billion  over  seven  years.  For  larger  producers,  the
proposal had the potential for being even more restrictive by eliminating the
three-entity rule, and by attributing payments  to uniquely individualized
social  security  numbers.  Large  farms  may  have  feared  these  payment
limitation  changes  more  than  other  features  of FTFA.  Rice  and  cotton
producers were particularly adamant against FTFA because of  the elimina-
tion of target prices  and marketing  loan  provisions, which  have  unified
cotton and rice producers,  and affiliated agribusinesses. The alignment of
the  entire  cotton  and  rice sectors  from  input suppliers,  to producers,  to
processors, to community has so far proved a powerful force in slowing the
FTFA bandwagon.
Congressmen Emerson (R-MO) and Combest (R-TX) represented their
southern commodity constituencies by adapting the Agricultural Competi-
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requirements.  This  required  an  increase  in  the  nonpaid  acreage  (NFA)
provisions to 30 percent, while giving farmers flexibility to plant alternative
program  crops  if they  gave  up  payments  (OFA).  Otherwise,  program
provisions remained essentially the same as under the 1990 Farm Bill. Even
then, it was not clear that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) would
score this proposal as saving the requisite $13.4  billion.
The Democratic  alternative on the House side was designed to achieve
only $4.2  billion  in cuts,  largely  reflecting their and the administration's
position against the proposed Republican tax cuts. This proposal was not
much different than that of Emerson and Combest, except that it increased
the NFA to only 21  percent, from  15  percent under the  1990 Farm Bill.
On the  Senate side,  Senator Cochran  had crafted his ACA  early in the
debate.  It had an  initially  lower  $5.4  billion  spending reduction  and  25
percent NFA. This was subsequently increased to 30 percent NFA, once it
was clear that the Senate leadership was buying into the Republican tax cut
and  the  $13.4  billion  reconciliation  package.  This  made  the  proposal
initially developed by Senator Cochran  essentially  the same as that pro-
moted by Congressmen Emerson and Combest.
Although providing public rhetoric in favor of FTFA, it became clear to
the Senate Chair that he could not get this type of program out of Committee.
He then attempted  to pacify the cotton  and rice interests by developing  a
blend of FTFA with 35 percent NFA cotton and rice provisions. While it was
never completely clear as to how/whether acreage movements would occur
among wheat/feed grains and cotton/rice, this option appeared to die a rapid
political death for lack of Committee support.
While the majority was trying to arrive at a consensus, Senate Democrats
had been working on a targeted marketing loan proposal. It would eliminate
the target price, while setting the marketing loan rate higher for the first level
of production, and lower for larger quantities. This was designed to provide
differentially higher benefits to smaller producers. Regionally, the Demo-
crats had trouble getting together on this proposal.
A few points regarding the economic  impacts of these proposals merit
mention:
* With the exception of cotton  under  FTFA, most representative  crop
farms that the Agricultural and Food Policy Center analyzed were found to
be worse off under these proposals than under an extension ofthe 1990 Farm
Bill.  Even  with  cotton,  if the  price  path  projected  in  baseline  analysis
157declined by as little as  10 percent, FTFA income would run lower than the
baseline, as would other alternatives  involving  increased NFA options.
* Whether,  during the period of analysis,  FTFA was better off than the
ACA depended  on price expectations  and the ability to take advantage  of
flex opportunities.  If market  prices were  expected  to  be relatively  high
(presumably reflecting  strong export demand), participating  crop farmers
would be better off with FTFA. If crop prices were expected to be relatively
low, farmers would  be better off with the ACA proposals.
* Program  impacts  are  always  dependent  on  assumptions  regarding
implementation.  These assumptions are never spelled out in the proposals
themselves. For example, the level of CRP generally was stated as a range,
making impact analysis difficult and less precise.
* New  analytical  challenges  were  presented  by  options  that  involve
program  combinations,  such  as  FTFA/35  percent  Flex Blend.  One  such
option, not previously discussed  in this article,  involves giving farmers a
choice  between  FTFA  and  ACA  provisions.  This  so-called  "People's
Choice" option was an analytical  nightmare.  If it happens to become law,
this option will be a farmer's decision nightmare, as well as for those other
agribusinesses  in the food and fiber system.
* With large changes  in policies, acreages  that would be expected to go
out  of production  are  virtually  impossible  to  predict.  Such  shifts  could
materially affect beef prices (cows, calves, stockers and feeders) as well as
crop prices.
Reflections  on the Contributions of Policy  Educators
Despite  the  difficulties  and  uncertainties  of analysis,  it  is  clear  that
economists had more input into the political process for the 1995 Farm Bill
than on any  previous legislation.  For example, the AFPC/FAPRI  system
completed  18  requested  studies/reports  by late  September  1995-more
than double previous farm bills. Economists from the University of Califor-
nia at Davis, the  University of  Maryland,  Kansas State  University  and
Louisiana State University  are also known to have provided higher levels
of  analytical  input  than  had  been  the  case  in  the  previous  farm  bills.
Moreover, efforts to conceptualize and crystallize alternatives  and conse-
quences  involving  less  spending  and  government  involvement  received
more than the usual amount of analytical  attention.
158TABLE 1.  HOUSE  1995 FARM  BILL POLICY OPTIONS
PROVISIONS  FREEDOM  -TO-FARM  HOUSE AG  HOUSE  DEMOCRATIC
COMPETITIVENESS  RECONCILIATION
ACT  ALTERNATIVE
Target  Price  None  No change  No change
CCC  Loan  Nonrecourse at 70%  of  Nonrecourse  at 85%  No change
5-year average or lower  of 5-year average
to clear  market
Flexibility  Ful within  30%  NFAI  21%  NFAI
Total Acre  Base (TAB)  75% OFA within TAB  79% OFA within TAB
&  Secretary approval
ARP Authority  None  Retained  Retained
CRP  25 -38 M  acres  17  M  acres in  2002  32 M  acres in  2002
Marketing Loan  None  Retained  Retained
Soybeans  Included in  TAB  but no  $5.50/bu. loan rate  No change
support other than loan  may be reduced to $5,
25% two-way flex
Payment Umit  Eiminate 3  entity  No change  Reduced from
Social Securiy Number  $50,000 to $47,000
attribution
Transition Payments  Yes  None  .None
Budget Savings  $13.4 B  over 7  years  $13.4 B  over 7  years  $42 B  over 7  years
___  _  S_________________$6.4  B over 10  years
TABLE 2.  SENATE  1995 FARM  BILL POLICY OPTIONS
PROVISIONS  FREEDOM  -TO-FARM/  SENATE AG  SENATE
35% FLEX BLEND  COMPETITIVENESS  TARGETED  MARKETING
ACT  LOAN
Target Price  Eliminated  for wheat  No  change  None
&  feed grain
Retained for cotton &  rice
CCC Loan  Loan rates lowered to  Nonrecourse at 85%  See marketing loan
generate $1B  savings  of 5-year average
over 7  years
Flexibility  Full for wheat &  25%  NFA  Transition to full
feed grains  75%  OFA  within (TAB)
Cotton &  rice 35%  NFA
100% OFA
ARP Authority  Eliminated  for wheat  Retained  Retained
&  feed grains
Retained for cotton &  rice
CRP  17  M  acres in  2002?  17  M  acres in  2002  Up to 36 M  acres
Marketing  Loan  Retained for cotton &  rice  Retained  but sets wheat  Two tier, higher for first
repayment to be world  level of production
market competitive
Soybeans  25% two-way flex appied  $5.50/bu. loan rate  Provides marketing  loan
to cotton &  rice  may be reduced to $5,
25% two-way flex
Payment  Umit  $100,000 per person in  No  change  Repeal 3  entity, resident
wheat &  feed grain  labor &  management,  SSN,
contracts  $50,000 payment limit,
$100,000 off farm
Transition Payments  Wheat &  feed grains  None  None
Budget Savings  $16.5  B  over 7  years $5.4 B  over 7  years $4.2 B  over 7  years
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